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We study an interacting agent model of a game-theoretical economy. The agents 
play a minority-subsequently-majority game and they learn, using backpropagation 
networks, to obtain higher payoffs. We study the relevance of heterogeneity to 
performance, and how heterogeneity emerges. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we are concerned with the notion of heterogeneity in 
models with networked/interacting elements; we are interested to explore 
whether heterogeneity of elements is necessary or at all useful to the 
optimization carried out collectively by the system dynamics. The 
existence of ecosystems with heterogenous species cooperating towards 
the collective survivalibity suggests that heterogeneity is perhaps at least 
advantageous. In econophysics, heterogeneous agent models (e.g. ref. 
[1]) have been proposed to account for behaviour of markets, and in other 
models, the emergence of heterogeneity have been observed [2,3]. 
We would like to investigate the emergence of heterogeneity with the 
ultimate hope of understanding the underlying physics. We choose the 
specific context of a model with initially symmetric agents interacting to 
learn strategies to maximize rewards in an iterated global game without 
known analytic solutions as yet [4]. The agents learn through individual 
backpropagation-type neural networks, and we decode learnt strategies 
from the resulting pattern of synaptic strengths. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We chose to work in the context of a model where agents play an 
iterative game with global interactions, in the sense that payoffs do not 
depend locally on individual agents’ moves separately, but collectively 
on the moves seen together, and with delayed payoffs, in the sense that 
they depend on the values of the players’ future moves. In particular, 
subscribing to some economic intuition, we design payoffs in such a way 
that we reward (near-) minority choices which later on become popular. 
(This is an extension of the minority game [5]). The unpredictability 
introduced by having delayed payoffs is hoped to prevent agents all 
learning calculable optimum behaviour as in models with known 
solutions, thus to offer a greater chance of producing ‘spontaneous’ 
heterogeneity. 
N players or agents k each choses one of n options i. If ik(t) is k’s 
choice at timestep t, then payoffs pi for moves i at t is taken to be 
 
pi(t) = ∑k δ(i,ik(t+1)) - ∑k δ(i,ik(t))    (1) 
 
where the Kronecker delta δ(x,y) = 1 when x = y and 0 otherwise. 
We choose a system with learning agents rather than an evolutionary 
system. Agents learn online using a neural network without hidden units, 
by employing a variant of the back-propagation algorithm [6], or 
equivalently, Hebbian learning with nonlinearity. For an input u 
contributing to the output ik(t), the synaptic strength Tkui between them 
changes by 
 
∆Tkui = η( pi - hki) f'(hki) + χι     (2) 
 
where η is the learning rate, hki is the field for the neuron representing ik,    
 
hki = Σu  Tkui u,      (3) 
 
f'(x) is the differential of the neuron transfer function (the nonlinearity), 
taken to be  
 
f'(x)  = 1/(x2+1),      (4) 
 
and χ is a ‘creativity’ factor incorporating ‘noise’ or some ‘non-zero 
temperature’ effects via the random number ι picked from a uniform 
random distribution between 0 and 1. Initial synaptic values are small 
random numbers equally likely to be positive or negative. Without 
learning (η = 0), option choices are random.  
Agents decide on options through a competitive network [7] 
involving the final layer neurons; in particular, the agent k choses the 
option I if hkI = max({hki }i). We further defined the memory M of agents 
as the number of timesteps back that they remember of payoffs and 
moves. Cases where M = 0 then are equivalent to random choices. 
We can vary the amount of  information available from which the 
agents can learn. Inputs u to the field for decision and to the learning may 
consist only of each respective agent’s own previous moves (‘self 
learning’). A more plausible scenario is where u also include previous 
resulting payoffs (‘learning with payoff’), and with information, there is 
also the case where in addition to these, the previous moves of other 
agents contribute to the decision-making and the learning (‘learning with 
information’). A model of culture is also explored where there is a direct 
contribution to the ‘knowledge’ stored in an agent’s synapses from those 
of the others: 
 
Tkui := ε (∑ k’≠ k  Tk’ui ) + (1- ε)  Tkui    (5) 
 
with ε being the ‘culture factor’ and this inclusion of culture is carried 
out after learning (with information) is done (‘learning with culture’).  
We have looked for the emergence of heterogeneity in these cases, 
taking heterogeneity in performances to indicate heterogeneity in 
gameplay [4]. This paper extends this by searching for heterogeneity in 
gameplay by looking at learnt synaptic patterns. The long-time behaviour 
of agents are coded in the respective eventual patterns of synaptic 
strengths; we search for any systematics in synaptic patterns in cases 
where heterogeneity in performances emerges. 
 
3. Simulation details 
 
We carried out studies on the model using computer simulations. 
Specifically, 10 agents choose between 5 options. The following 
parameters were used: initial randomness (maximum magnitude of initial 
random value for synapses) 0.1, creativity 0.1, culture factor 0.2 and 
learning rate 0.1. We studied (100 random trials) long-time behaviour 
(after 1000 timesteps) of cases of no learning, self learning, learning with 
payoff, learning with information and learning with culture, each with 
zero memory, and memories of 1, 3 and 7.  
We investigated the mean (between agents) average (over timesteps) 
payoffs obtained by agents, which measures the average performance of 
the players, and the standard deviation (between agents) of the average 
payoffs, which gives a measure of variety of the performances. We chose 
cases where standard deviations are large, and study synaptic patterns 
possessed by agents in these cases. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
We have reported results of studies on the various learning cases 
previously [4]. Cases of no learning and all cases of learning with zero 
memory yield typically a well-defined cluster of means of average payoff 
at around -0.8 and standard deviations between about 0.02 to 0.08, 
specifying the performance in a completely random situation. Self 
learning generally betters the average performances without significantly 
increasing variances with better average performances when only 
immediately recent states are remembered. Learning with information 
shows similar behaviour to learning with payoff, both showing better 
overall performances through higher means, and emergence of variety 
through increased standard deviations. Learning with culture smears the 
means and makes them vary substantially, but the standard deviations 
remain more or less in the band defined by no learning. 
 We choose the case of learning with payoff with memory 1 which 
contains events with largest values of standard deviations (Fig. 1). 
(Interestingly, a linear trend in the standard deviation-mean scatter, 
which persists with higher statistics, can be detected. This can be further 
investigated elsewhere.) Fig. 2 shows individual agent payoffs in a 
sample of 4 of the events with large standard deviations, showing the 
spread. Although the hint exists, strongly in one case, there is no clear 
clustering of performances as might be expected when segregation in 
strategies happen. Also there is a possibility of a 1-versus-the rest kind of 
clustering or segregation, with one agent outshining the rest. 
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Fig. 1. Standard deviation vs mean of average payoffs for the case of learning with 
payoff and memory 1. 
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Fig. 2. Individual agent payoffs for events with large variances. 
 
 We then select the event with the strong hint of segregation, and 
compare synaptic patterns of agents within and between the clusters. We 
did not detect any systematic similarities within clusters nor any 
systematic differences between clusters. For example, the synaptic 
patterns for the 2 best performers in the better-performing cluster are 
shown in Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 3. Synaptic patterns (synaptic strengths vs option to take vs last option taken, with 
respect to last payoffs – left, and to last self choices – right) for agents with better 
average payoffs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Through the employment of learning agents in a global game with 
delayed payoffs, we studied the emergence of heterogeneity. Taking 
variance in performances to be an indication of heterogenous strategies, 
we looked at events with largest standard deviations in the average 
payoffs. Our study did not detect any systematic similarities in strategies 
(as depicted by end synaptic patterns) between the better performers, nor 
any systematic differences in strategies between better and poorer 
performers. However, a future higher-statistics study may possibly 
uncover such segregating behaviour in the system.  
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